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ESSAY

HELPLESS GIANTS? THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE’S
ABILITY TO INFLUENCE AND MANAGE EXTERNAL
THREATS TO REDWOOD NATIONAL AND STATE
PARKS
Jack McLeod*
INTRODUCTION
National parks in the United States exist for two related yet opposed purposes:
to preserve areas of national or scenic importance, and to provide for the enjoyment
of said areas by the public.1 The federal government tasked the National Park
Service (NPS) with numerous tools to supervise interior park areas.2 A focus on
preservation solely within park boundaries, however, would spell doom for these
American treasures. Externalities threaten scenic values for nearly every national
park in the United States; more than half of the major threats to national parks begin
outside their walls,3 “threatening to engulf [the parks], causing increasingly severe
damage within the parks to the values and resources which they were set aside to
preserve.”4 Since “few national parks encompass within their boundaries the entire

© 2018 Jack McLeod. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute
copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy
identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this
provision and copyright notice.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2018. Thank you to
Professor John Nagle for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay and for providing
a number of helpful sources for me to use. Moreover, thank you to my parents for encouraging my
creativity and supporting my legal education. I wish to thank my dad, in particular, for first showing
me the California redwoods. Finally, thank you to the tireless and skillful editing of the Notre
Dame Law Review Online editors. All errors are my own.
1 See 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014).
2 See id. § 200103.
3 William J. Lockhart, External Threats to Our National Parks: An Argument for
Substantive Protection, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 40 (1997).
4 Id. at 41; see also James E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57
ALA. L. REV. 417, 456 (2005) (“[T]he ‘external threats’ to wilderness areas are a constant reminder
of how connected landscapes remain in the face of legal constructs.”); Joseph L. Sax, Buying
Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE L.J. 709.
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ecosystems necessary to maintain natural balance,”5 these problems will persist
indefinitely if not halted.
Unfortunately, the NPS has presented a mixed response to external threats. Its
alleged failure to meaningfully stem the tide of external threats to scenic resources
has resulted in many commentators proclaiming it unable to protect its landmarks.
Professor Joseph Sax argued that “[f]ull protection of the parks from incompatible
[external] development is . . . plainly impracticable.”6 The NPS itself has claimed
that it possesses “no direct regulatory authority to ensure that park resources are not
harmed by projects outside of its borders,”7 while others believe that the NPS “is
generally unable to regulate or to control effectively activities or developments
originating on federal, state or private lands located outside park boundaries.” 8
Therefore, though threats to national parks inside their walls remain important, the
“more vexing questions are usually whether . . . Congress has delegated authority to
the federal land managing agency to abate the threats from non-federal
development—and if so, whether the agency has the will to exercise it.” 9
Rarely is this problem so acute as in Redwood National and State Parks
(RNSP). Redwood National Park sits adjacent to state and private land, which both
impact federal redwood trees. Moreover, “[a]s a result of a political compromise
struck by the Ninetieth Congress, the boundaries of the Redwood National Park did
not reflect the ecological realities . . . of the redwood forests.”10 Like other parks,
RNSP therefore lies at the mercy of external actors.
Much remains to be lost if external threats prevail over the redwood’s ancient
beauty. President Reagan once said that “[a] tree is a tree. How many more do you
have to look at?” when considering a Redwood National Park proposal. 11 With all
due respect to President Reagan, redwood trees exemplify some of the most scenic
forests in the world. RNSP preserves “the largest remaining contiguous section of

5 THE CONSERVATION FOUND., NATIONAL PARKS FOR A NEW GENERATION: VISIONS,
REALITIES, PROSPECTS 126 (1985).
6 Sax, supra note 4, at 712.
7 Lockhart, supra note 3, at 4 (quoting Letter from Robert Barbee, Superintendent,
Yellowstone Nat’l Park, to Mike DaSilva, Coordinator of the Envtl. Impact Statement on the New
World Project proposal by Crown Butte Mines, Inc., Mont. Dep’t of State Lands 4 (Dec. 17, 1993)
(on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Journal).
8 Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the External Threats Dilemma,
20 U. WYO. LAND & WATER L. REV. 355, 356 (1985).
9 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
1081–82 (6th ed. 2007).
10 Dale A. Hudson, Sierra Club v. Department of Interior: The Fight to Preserve the
Redwood National Park, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 781 (1978).
11 Carl Pope, If You’ve Seen One Redwood, You’ve Seen Them All—Not!, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 12, 2006, 5:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-pope/if-youve-seen-oneredwood_b_24927.html.

HELPLESS GIANTS?

2018]

133

ancient coast redwood forest . . . [and] some of the world’s tallest and oldest trees.”12
The trees “humble[]”13 those who walk among them,
with their ponderous strength, reaching toward the sky like pillars of a temple.
With the mystic beauty and stately magnitude of the sun-filtered towering forms,
the almost infinite variety of light and shade and color, and the unfolding life and
beauty of the forest, the big redwoods are not looked at; they are experienced . . . .
14
An awe-inspiring element of time pervades these living relics . . . .

Their scenic beauty, however, remains imperiled today by external threats.
Despite attempts to reduce logging, “[t]here are still ancient redwoods slated for
cutting that need to be protected.”15
This Essay analyzes the interactions between federal, state, and private
landowners regarding RNSP to determine what power the NPS has to stop the
destruction of its trees resulting from externalities. Part I briefly discusses the
historical development of RNSP, focusing on how its boundaries impact inner scenic
resources. Part II argues that California state efforts have traditionally hampered
redwood protection in RNSP, and Part III examines the limited resources the NPS
possesses to protect redwoods. Ultimately, the NPS has few effective tools at its
disposal to protect redwoods against external threats, except nuisance litigation. If
the NPS cannot successfully influence external forces, national parks—and
redwoods themselves—will truly become “helpless giants.”16

I.

THE HISTORY OF EXTERNAL THREATS TO RNSP

No matter whether the redwoods represent helpless giants today, they certainly
held that title in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eager to exploit their
economic potential, private loggers had purchased thousands of acres of redwood
lands in California by 1879—nearly all available redwood growths.17 By 1900,
logging became “the most important industry in California.” 18 Activists scored early
victories against loggers in the 1920s, when they first began purchasing redwood
land from loggers. In 1921, the Save the Redwoods League convinced the California
legislature to buy land along the Redwood Highway for $300,000, negotiating with

12 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL MANAGEMENT
PLAN/GENERAL PLAN: REDWOOD NATIONAL AND STATE PARKS, HUMBOLDT AND DEL NORTE
COUNTIES, CALIFORNIA 12 (2000).
13 Hudson, supra note 10, at 784 (quoting Bonnie Newton, Heritage of the World: The
Eternal Redwoods, NAT’L PARKS & CONSERVATION MAG., Sept. 1973, at 20).
14 Id. (quoting Newton, supra note 13, at 18, 20–21).
15 About
Redwoods,
SAVE
THE
REDWOODS
LEAGUE,
https://www.savetheredwoods.org/redwoods/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) [hereinafter About
Redwoods].
16 Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands,
75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 241 (1976).
17 DARREN FREDERICK SPEECE, DEFENDING GIANTS: THE REDWOOD WARS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 45 (2017); League Milestones,
SAVE THE REDWOODS LEAGUE,
https://www.savetheredwoods.org/about-us/missionhistory/league-milestones/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
18 Hudson, supra note 10, at 789.
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one of the most powerful loggers, Pacific Lumber, in the process. 19 By 1964, the
Save the Redwoods League had negotiated with logging companies to help
California acquire 102,000 acres of redwoods in areas they later transferred to states,
today called Del Norte Coast and Jedediah Smith Redwoods State Parks. 20
Largely due to the success activists enjoyed in countering powerful logging
companies, legislative interest in protecting other redwoods declined; the activists
had already “saved” the trees.21 Activists continued to battle loggers until 1968,
when Congress passed the bill creating Redwood National Park. 22 The Act,
however, did not adequately protect redwoods; it “was the culmination of a fouryear political struggle and represented a compromise between several competing
interest groups.”23
Since its proponents navigated various competing and uncooperative interests,
“park boundaries were tailored to meet political needs instead of ecological realities,
[and] the drafters anticipated that problems would be encountered in . . . protecting
the park.”24 The final Redwood National Park Act failed to include key watersheds,
but did contain three state parks (Prairie Creek, Jedediah Smith, and Del Norte
Coast).25 From the onset, park boundaries did not represent conservation but
politics, arbitrarily designed not to protect redwoods but to protect a smorgasbord of
conflicting interests. The Act did not leave the NPS helpless to defend the redwoods,
however. It delegated to the Secretary of Interior the power to modify park
boundaries and acquire nearby land to assure external threats did not harm park
resources.26
Logging operations outside Redwood National Park created many risks to trees
under NPS protection. Logging companies built numerous roads to transport fallen
trees.27 Constructing these roads exposed slopes and made the surrounding area
more susceptible to erosion. 28 Even normal logging operations disturbed the soil’s
natural vegetative cover and drainage routes.29 These developments caused eroded
sediment to wash into Redwood Creek, which flowed directly into RNSP.30 As
streambeds inside RNSP eroded, they carried away soil that redwoods needed to
stand upright.31 Not only would wind more easily topple redwoods, but erosion of
streambeds caused moisture to leave with the soil, depriving trees of oxygen in the
19
20

SPEECE, supra note 17, at 51.
Hudson, supra note 10, at 790; see also EDWIN C. BEARSS, REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK:
HISTORY BASIC DATA ch. XIV (1969).
21 Hudson, supra note 10, at 790.
22 Redwood National Park Act, Pub. L. No. 90-545, 82 Stat. 931 (1968).
23 Hudson, supra note 10, at 794. These struggles can be traced to many sources, such as
political delays and financial restraints from the Vietnam War, coupled with internal discord among
conservation groups over which redwood basins to protect. See id. at 794–97.
24 Id. at 794.
25 Id. at 798, 803; see Redwood National Park, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 15, 2015),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/national-parks/redwood-national-park/.
26 Hudson, supra note 10, at 803.
27 See NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 19.
28 Id.
29 Hudson, supra note 10, at 786–87.
30 NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 19–20.
31 Id. at 19.
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water.32 Additionally, other external threats, like air and water pollution as well as
human development, threatened redwoods in the 1970s and 1980s, 33 and continue
today.34
These external threats directly impacted scenic experiences for hikers within
RNSP. Hikers frequently saw clear-cut space just beyond park boundaries, causing
the “visual character of Redwood Creek’s alluvial plain [to be] . . . modified by
deposition of sawed logs, battered culverts and logging cables. . . . Pools have been
filled and sculptured logs and streamside vegetation buried by fine gravel.” 35
External threats thereby caused “obvious aesthetic damage” 36 to the park. Clearly,
the boundaries established by the 1968 Act could not remain. “Continued timber
harvesting on the excluded land was so harmful to the park that ten years later
Congress added 48,000 acres to the park at a cost that may reach half a billion
dollars.”37 That congressional action was the Redwood National Park Expansion
Act of 1978.38
House Representative Phillip Burton sponsored the Redwood National Park
Expansion Act to correct the wrongs of the initial 1968 Act. In his opening remarks,
he emphasized that logging and water damage on nearby lands jeopardized the
“durab[ility]” of Redwood National Park. 39 He noted that due to boundary
inefficiencies, the Department of Interior had not stemmed the tide of external
threats, or was unwilling to do so.40 He cited numerous reports showing the need
for protection against actions originating outside the Park,41 and stated that the
“[c]learcut logging on privately owned lands adjacent . . . continues to cause
substantial, and perhaps irreparable, damage to . . . esthetics.”42 Scenic impairment
from external threats therefore occupied a central focus in the Park’s expansion.
The legislative history of the Expansion Act also addressed the authority of the
Department of Interior to impact areas external to RNSP. The House Committee on
the Interior and Insular Affairs stated that, without additional authority, the Interior’s
“ability to adopt fair and effective cooperative agreements and contracts is totally

32 Id.; see also Hudson, supra note 10, at 786–87.
33 RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY
ch. 6 (1997); see Steve Norman, Fire and Forest Fragmentation, COAST REDWOOD ECOLOGY &
MGMT., https://redwood.forestthreats.org/fragmentation.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) (“As the
human population expands within the coast redwood range, the margins of some privately held
second growth experience economic pressure to be subdivided for homes. This brings the wildlandurban interface closer to park boundaries.”).
34 See About Redwoods, supra note 15 (discussing how pollution and climate change cause
uncertainty for the future of redwoods).
35 Hudson, supra note 10, at 842 (quoting Richard J. Janda, Recent Man-Induced
Modifications of the Physical Resources of the Redwood Creek Unit of Redwood National Park,
California, and the Processes Responsible for Those Modifications 3–4 (U.S. Geological Survey,
Open-File Report Ser. No. 75-561, 1975)).
36 Id. at 806.
37 Sax, supra note 4, at 712.
38 Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 (1978).
39 121 CONG. REC. 11,347 (1975) (statement of Rep. Burton).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 123 CONG. REC. 4,965 (1977) (statement of Rep. Burton).
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dependent upon the attitudes of the concerned companies.” 43 The Committee thus
proposed that the amendment permit “the rehabilitation of areas within and upstream
from the park; to authorize the adoption of regulations, after consultation with the
State of California and a finding that the existing State regulations are inadequate” 44
to give NPS actions teeth outside park boundaries. The final bill, however, did not
include these provisions; the Interior could rehabilitate areas only after contracting
with the state government, and the final bill excluded independent Interior regulatory
authority.45
RNSP faces other external threats today that have yet to be resolved. A
highway expansion plan along RNSP borders would eliminate fifty-four redwood
trees, while placing human development even closer to park boundaries. 46 In 2016,
California’s Board of Forestry approved logging of 402 acres of redwood forest in
the lower Gualala River.47 Though California courts ordered the Board to revise its
timber harvest plan for the Gualala River, timber companies may later revise it. 48
Approval of such plans, though far from RNSP, “could set a precedent for granting
future logging efforts in sensitive habitats statewide.”49 Finally, as President Donald
Trump proposed to reduce the Interior’s budget by $1.6 billion, 50 an alreadystrapped NPS reduced its workforce in “nearly 90 percent of parks” and received
“23 percent fewer resources to fund the highest-priority resource management

43 AMENDING THE ACT OF OCTOBER 2, 1968, AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A REDWOOD
NATIONAL PARK IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. DOC. NO. 95581, at 25 (95th Sess. 1977). The Committee also cited Secretary of the Interior Andrus, who said
that park expansion remains unnecessary so long as the timber activities are regulated by California
with NPS guidance. Id. Thus, NPS actors preferred cooperation with state governments and
loggers to NPS action.
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163, 165.
Why the final bill did not include these protections is not clear based on the legislative record.
46 Jamie Henn, Is California Still Cutting Down Redwood Trees?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
12,
2011,
10:16
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamie-henn/is-california-stillcutti_b_1008161.html. The highway plan would also disrupt the roots of sixty-six additional trees.
Id.
47 Peter Baye & Rick Coates, Notice of Intent to Sue CAL FIRE Over Approval of
Controversial Gualala River Floodplain Redwood Logging—“Dogwood” Timber Harvest Plan,
Sonoma
County,
FRIENDS
OF
GUALALA
RIVER
(July
11,
2016),
http://gualalariver.org/forestry/floodplain-logging/notice-intent-sue-cal-fire-approvalcontroversial-gualala-river-floodplain-redwood-logging-dogwood-timber-harvest-plan-sonomacounty/.
48 See Frank Robertson, Environmentalists Get Attorneys’ Fees for Halting Gualala
Logging,
CLOVERDALE
REVEILLE
(July
5,
2017),
http://www.sonomawest.com/cloverdale_reveille/news/environmentalists-get-attorneys-fees-forhalting-gualala-logging/article_64a7b954-61c3-11e7-837a-5bb41ca981d5.html.
49 Taylor Hill, A Plan to Log Century-Old Redwoods Could Set a Bad Precedent, TAKEPART
(July 15, 2016), http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/07/15/redwood-century-old-loggingapproved.
50 Devin Henry, Lawmakers Take Aim at Trump’s Interior Budget, THE HILL (June 8, 2017),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/336944-lawmakers-take-aim-at-trumps-interiorbudget.
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projects . . . including . . . mitigation of threats.”51 Without the necessary funds to
acquire land or manage external threats, RNSP remains at risk for future harm.
When the NPS assumed joint control with California over RNSP in 1994,52 it
did so with little regulatory authority to impact external threats. The NPS still had
some allies in protecting the redwoods, however. NPS’s partner, California,
previously established state schemes to defend against private logging.53 If these
ventures succeeded, the NPS’s apparent lack of authority would, effectively, be
irrelevant.

II.

STATE RESPONSES TO REDWOOD THREATS

The NPS itself believed that cooperation with states—or independent state
regulation itself—provided the first line of defense against external threats to
RNSP.54 Thus, when Congress first purchased Redwood National Park from private
landowners, it began “a long collaboration between the state and federal
governments regarding redwood parks.”55 Conflicts between the preservation goals
of the federal and state bodies persisted, however. Since development on private
lands is “ordinarily governed only by state law and local zoning codes,” 56 if private
lands produce threats to nearby RNSP lands, the NPS could stand at the mercy of
California regulations. The NPS recognized this, stating that active participation in
state and local land use decisions represented an important method to influence
decisions outside park boundaries.57 However, local land use bodies normally
succumb to pressure from private landowners who would impose far less strict
regulations than the NPS would prefer.58 Thus far, the NPS has occasionally worked

51 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at Overview-3, Overview-23 (2017),
https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/upload/FY-2018-NPS-Greenbook.pdf.
52 Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/redw/faqs.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
53 See generally Thomas Lundmark, Regulation of Private Logging in California, 5
ECOLOGY L.Q. 139 (1975).
54 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55 SPEECE, supra note 17, at 74; see Michael Mantell, The National Park System and
Development on Private Lands: Opportunities and Tools to Protect Park Resources, in EXTERNAL
DEVELOPMENT AFFECTING THE NATIONAL PARKS: PRESERVING “THE BEST IDEA WE EVER HAD”
1, 2 (1986) (“[T]he most important opportunities to protect National Park resources from the
adverse effects of development on private lands may lie less in the application of various legal
doctrines and more in a variety of cooperative mechanisms that involve local governments . . . .”).
56 George Cameron Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks from
External Threats, 22 U. WYO. LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); see also Darren Speece, From
Corporatism to Citizen Oversight: The Legal Fight over California Redwoods, 1970–1996, 14
ENVTL. HIST. 705, 716 (2009) (noting that forestry operations were generally “governed at the state
level”).
57 See NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 36; Mantell, supra note 55, at 27 (“Local
constituency building on the part of park staff can be an important response to external pressures.”).
To date, however, there have been few, if any, conflicts with local planning authorities that have
resulted in litigation.
58 Sax, supra note 4, at 710; see infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of local cooperation.

138

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 93

with localities in the redwoods, but little documentation exists of such interactions;
it has relied more expressly on state authorities to regulate externalities.
For most of the twentieth century, the NPS could do little but watch as the
California Department of Forestry’s Board of Forestry (CDF), a state body
overseeing private timber plans, eviscerated protections against logging on lands
adjacent to federal and state redwood parks. The CDF included timber
representatives in its decision-making process, ostensibly to improve the
effectiveness of its directives by allowing those regulated—who know the most
about their industry—to have a say.59 Predictably, the inclusion of loggers on a
board with dueling objectives to promote development and prevent environmental
harm favored the former goal. “[T]he Board was more committed to its economic
development goals than it was to its conservation mission.” 60 People “pecuniarily
interested in the timber industry” 61 therefore promulgated CDF decisions. 62 The
CDF continued harming the interests of Californian redwoods until local citizens
and activists began to sue.
Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors63 represented “the first successful
attack on the Board’s independence.”64 There, a local county board challenged the
CDF’s granting of harvesting permits to Bayside Timber. 65 The appellate court
found that the CDF’s membership consisted almost entirely of timber companies
and land owners, each having an interest in exploiting redwoods for monetary gain. 66
Since these private parties faced “no [legislative] guides or standards to prevent . . .
abuse,”67 they had “uncontrolled discretion”68 in choosing to protect—or not
protect—redwoods. As a result, the court held the CDF’s enabling legislation, the
Forest Practice Act, to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 69
Today, the CDF still faces challenges from citizens and localities. In Sierra
Club v. State Board of Forestry, the California Supreme Court noted the significant
judicial deference given to CDF decisions, requiring prejudice to overturn CDF
decisions.70 Yet, this deference can be overcome. The California Supreme Court
held that the CDF violated California environmental law by approving a timber plan
without examining any information about the plan’s impact on wildlife. 71 Though
courts owed the CDF deference, it could not engage in a merely cursory analysis of
59 See Speece, supra note 56, at 707.
60 Id. at 710.
61 Bayside Timber Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
62 See Speece, supra note 56, at 711.
63 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Cal Ct. App. 1971).
64 See Speece, supra note 56, at 712.
65 Bayside Timber Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
66 Id. at 435–36.
67 Id. at 437.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 438–40. California later passed an updated Forest Practice Act in response in 1973.
See Forest Practice, CAL FIRE, http://calfire.ca.gov/resource_mgt/resource_mgt_forestpractice
(last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
70 876 P.2d 505, 518 (Cal. 1994).
71 Id. at 519; see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to defer to CDF decision when it did not act according
to its authorized power).
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harvest plans. Even with the CDF’s reliance on timber representatives mitigated
after Bayside, it still largely deferred to timber plans,72 calling into question its
ability to reliably protect land outside RNSP.
This deference to timber plans has continued to alarming levels. For example,
in EPIC v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, the court analyzed
a Sustained Yield Plan (SYP) from Pacific Lumber. 73 Though the court largely
upheld the Board’s approval of the SYP, it chastised the CDF for its close
relationship with loggers. The CDF had delegated to Pacific Lumber the job of
revising parts of the SYP and consolidating documents into the agency’s final plan,
tasks within the CDF’s exclusive control.74 Like in Sierra Club v. State Board of
Forestry, the CDF excessively deferred to a timber company’s plan. 75 The plan
approved by the CDF also contained insufficient information about the area to be
harvested.76
The CDF must engage in more detailed discussions about
environmental impacts,77 no matter whether the effects of logging “may be expected
to fall on or off the logging site.”78 The Board, therefore, despite repeated court
decisions to the contrary, tends to side with questionable timber company plans,
failing to accurately consider their environmental impacts.
If the CDF can simply “rubber-stamp[]”79 timber companies’ harvest plans,
and private lands remain principally governed by state law, then the NPS may need
its own regulatory authority to protect internal redwoods. To be sure, the above
cases demonstrate that the CDF’s unilateral and unbridled authority to approve
logging plans has diminished over time, “forc[ing] the Board of Forestry to back
away from its traditional alliance with the timber industry.”80 Yet, continued
litigation against the CDF in the twenty-first century indicates it still fails to consider
many external effects of timber plan approvals, court orders notwithstanding.
What, then, can the NPS do to protect itself from inevitable externalities that
harm internal scenic resources? As noted above, the NPS can attempt to cooperate
with local and state governments to influence their decision-making processes.81 Yet

72 Even today, the CDF rarely hesitates to grant harvesting rights to timber companies. See,
e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010).
73 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008).
74 Id. at 911.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 916–17. California courts have held that if the CDF encounters evidence of damage
logging would do to the surrounding areas—such as academic papers or reports—the CDF must
engage in cumulative impact analysis for environmental damage elsewhere. See, e.g., Friends of
the Old Trees v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 308–10 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
77 See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Johnson, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502, 515–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
78 Friends of the Old Trees, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting
Laupheimer v. California, 246 Cal. Rptr. 82, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
79 Speece, supra note 56, at 720; see also id. at 721 (“Court after court found the Board guilty
of operating under a de facto policy of automatically approving timber harvest plans without
considering environmental effects.”).
80 Id. at 708.
81 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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cooperation, while useful in theory, provides little—if any—ability for the NPS to
meaningfully prevent external threats to RNSP. First, to the extent cooperation
would occur with state entities, the CDF would continue to play a prominent and
problematic role; cooperation with an agency with a track record of failure to protect
redwoods seems undesirable. Even when the NPS cooperated with the CDF in 1973,
“over the objections of the National Park Service, the Board ruled that clear-cutting
in the Redwood Creek watershed did not harm” 82 the Park and approved harmful
harvest plans. Moreover, on private lands upstream of RNSP, the CDF allows
private landowners to determine if they want the NPS to participate in preventative
measures like inspections—allowing their conflicts of interest to impair NPS
investigations.83
Second, the NPS still has no power to direct local or state authorities to enact
the regulations it wants. Historically, “the prospects for . . . abating [external]
threats through intergovernmental cooperation alone [have been] bleak” 84 because
NPS influence over other governments “is purely advisory and often ignored.” 85 The
importance of NPS’s purely advisory authority becomes magnified when the
localities with which it wishes to cooperate “ordinarily are satisfied with fewer
restrictions than the Park Service wants, because preservation is not their mission.”86
Therefore, though cooperation with local and state governments offers
promise, it can at best produce helpful but inferior ways for the NPS to influence
external threats. State agencies like the CDF have proven ineffective at protecting
redwoods whose logging produces harmful effects on RNSP lands. The NPS must
rely on its own authority to solve external threats.

III.

THE NPS’S ABILITY TO MANAGE EXTERNAL THREATS

Many commentators have vigorously debated whether the NPS possesses the
authority to regulate outside park boundaries. Some argue that the NPS does not
have such authority.87 They claim the Organic Act at best gives the NPS power over
federal lands, not private or state lands.88 On the other hand, many supporters of
increased NPS regulatory authority have contended that, even with ambiguous
Organic Act language, national parks can issue regulations covering external threats.
Under Section 1 of the Organic Act, the NPS must regulate the “use” of national
parks.89 Since common park experiences like hiking rely on vistas that can reach
outside parks, some argue that the “use” the NPS can regulate includes outside
82 Speece, supra note 56, at 714.
83 NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 12, at 23.
84 Coggins, supra note 56, at 19.
85 Sax, supra note 4, at 716.
86 Id. at 732.
87 See, e.g., COGGINS, supra note 9; Coggins, supra note 56; Keiter, supra note 8.
88 See COGGINS, supra note 9, at 1082 (stating that since Section 1 of the Organic Act says
the Secretary can regulate the use of “Federal areas,” it is a negative inference against regulating
non-federal areas); Coggins, supra note 56, at 17, 17 n.129 (describing the Organic Act as only
applicable to activities “within” a park based on the now-repealed language of 16 U.S.C. § 1);
Keiter, supra note 8, at 356; see also id. at 393 (“The Organic Act mandates the protection of park
resources but it does not extend Park Service jurisdiction beyond park boundaries.”).
89 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014).
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areas.90 Additionally, under the Redwoods Amendments 91 they claim Congress
evinced an intent for the NPS to become more involved in protecting against external
threats.92 The inability to conclusively resolve this debate has resulted in much
uncertainty among academics and government officials alike. 93
Regardless of whether the NPS has this authority, however, currently the
willpower and mechanisms to satisfy a duty to regulate against external threats do
not exist in the NPS. By examining the trio of Sierra Club cases from the mid1970s, it becomes demonstrably clear that even if a duty to regulate against external
threats applies to RNSP, the NPS faces difficulty, in its current form, fulfilling that
duty.

A. The Sierra Club Litigation and the Failure of the NPS Response
In Sierra Club v. Department of Interior (Sierra Club I), the activist Sierra
Club sued the Interior to force it to protect RNSP from damage by logging operations
on peripheral privately owned lands.94 The district court held that the Redwood
National Park Act “impose[s] a legal duty on the Secretary to utilize the specific
powers given to him whenever reasonably necessary for the protection of the park” 95
and that “any discretion vested in the Secretary concerning time, place and specifics
of the exercise of such powers is subordinate to his paramount legal duty . . . to
protect the park.”96 The court’s reference to the “place” of Secretary powers, then
to the legislative history of the Act (including a congressional intent for the NPS to
address externalities),97 shows a desire to apply this regulatory duty to external
threats. The importance of Sierra Club I cannot be overstated: “Sierra Club I is the
first reported case to hold that this trust relationship creates a judicially enforceable
duty to protect a national park from threatened injury” 98—and it happened to occur
for RNSP.
The Sierra Club remained unsatisfied with the NPS’s responses to external
loggings after Sierra Club I, so it sued again in 1975, claiming that logging continued
to occur and the Secretary of Interior had failed “to discharge his statutory and
fiduciary duty [established under Sierra Club I] to protect Redwood National Park
from damage caused by logging operations on privately owned lands immediately
adjacent to . . . the Park.”99 The court began Sierra Club II by noting that the
Redwood National Park enabling legislation “expressly vested the Secretary with
authority to take certain specifically stated steps designed to protect the Park from

90 See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 62; James J. Vinch, The Telecommunications Act of 1996
and Viewshed Protection for the National Scenic Trails, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 118–19
(1999).
91 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
92 See Lockhart, supra note 3, at 61, 65–67; Vinch, supra note 90, at 124.
93 Lockhart, supra note 3, at 47–48.
94 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior (Sierra Club I), 376 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
95 Id. at 95.
96 Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 94 n.3.
98 Hudson, supra note 10, at 815.
99 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior (Sierra Club II), 398 F. Supp. 284, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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damage caused by logging operations on the surrounding privately owned lands.” 100
These steps included three explicit measures: modification of boundaries,
acquisition of interests in land or cooperative agreements with peripheral
landowners, and acquisition of land near the highway. 101 Since RNSP boundaries
authorized by Congress “represented a compromise and did not include” important
areas just outside the Park,102 the Secretary had a duty to ensure those areas did not
jeopardize NPS lands.103
Here, the Secretary failed to fulfill his duties by ignoring multiple reports that
showed logging upstream caused detrimental effects in Redwood National Park. He
knew of, and then summarily disregarded, at least four reports—two from the
Interior itself—that recommended the Interior take immediate action to create buffer
zones, prevent adjacent logging, acquire land, and cooperate with companies. 104 The
court commanded the Secretary to acquire land interests, contract with peripheral
landowners, modify park boundaries, ask Congress for funds, and give the Sierra
Club a progress report on its compliance with the court order. 105 For the first time,
a court gave specific orders for the Interior to meet a duty to prevent external park
threats.
The Interior’s response to this order and the Northern District of California’s
third foray into the Sierra Club litigation evince the prohibitive difficulty in meeting
the court’s terms. The Interior attempted multiple solutions to external threats and
each failed. It first attempted to cooperate with the CDF.106 The Interior mistakenly
relied on CDF regulation to solve the problem “without inquiring into the adequacy
of state restrictions.”107 In a striking example of the failure of cooperation between
state and federal agencies, the NPS presented a formal report to the CDF explaining
the damage to the Park from state–approved timber harvests, and recommended
restrictions on private actors.108 The CDF rejected all proposed restrictions. 109 In a
similarly futile effort to cooperate with timber companies, they rejected Interior
guidelines for adjacent lands, instead choosing to self-regulate.110
The Interior considered acquiring land threatening the Park, but it could not
secure the funds. The cost would rise to a prohibitive ceiling of $500 million, and
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejected an Interior proposal for a
$15 million buffer zone purchase.111 When the Interior boldly requested the OMB

100 Id. at 286.
101 Id. at 286–87 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 79b(a), 79c(d), 79c(e) (1970)).
102 Id. at 286.
103 Id. at 287.
104 Id. at 287–91.
105 Id. at 294.
106 Hudson, supra note 10, at 824.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 830.
109 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior (Sierra Club III), 424 F. Supp. 172, 174 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Hudson, supra note 10, at 830.
110 Sierra Club III, 424 F. Supp. at 174.
111 Id. at 173–74.
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draft legislation granting “new additional regulatory power over peripheral timber
operations,” the OMB denied the request. 112
Therefore, in a convincing defeat of Interior efforts, “all federal, state, and
private entities involved with the problem refused to assist the NPS in meeting the
terms of the court’s original order.”113 Clearly, it is one issue whether the NPS in
fact has a duty to regulate or influence external actors; it is another issue entirely
whether compliance with that duty remains feasible. The Sierra Club III court
concluded that further efforts to request funding or regulatory powers from the OMB
“would be futile,”114 and since the Interior made a good-faith effort to comply with
a seemingly insurmountable problem, it could not be held liable. 115 Thus, current
mechanisms to combat external threats to redwoods will likely fail.
Other reasons exist explaining why the NPS, as it currently stands, cannot
adequately protect RNSP from external threats. First, NPS “reticence toward
exercising authority outside park boundaries has been pronounced and longstanding.”116 Its response to Sierra Club II notwithstanding, the NPS has historically
lacked the willingness to expand its reach outside its borders. The NPS itself
believes it needs additional authority to regulate outside its borders.117 It has stated
that the external threats problem “would have to be solved in the political
process,”118 not with NPS action. This mentality may be due to concerns over NPS
popularity; engaging in external regulation likely to produce tangible costs, like
unemployment, for the abstract benefit of scenic parks could cause the NPS to be
perceived as a “meddlesome neighbor.”119 Regardless, if the NPS remains unwilling
to accept a larger role, then no amount of authority will protect RNSP.
Second, Congress does not want to give the NPS additional regulatory power
because it wishes to avoid intruding on traditional state and local property
authority.120 Private landowners would “see themselves as . . . subservient to the
federal lands”121 and Congress would not want to create federalism concerns.
Third, the NPS’s major tools for protecting inner scenic resources—land
acquisition and boundary modification—prove too expensive and cause more
headaches than they are worth. Land acquisition, as noted above, remains highly
expensive, which—for RNSP—would already add to “the most expensive national
park in history.”122 But more fundamentally, boundary problems will persist so long
as boundaries exist. Acquiring land or modifying boundaries changes little, for
112 Id. at 174.
113 Coggins, supra note 56, at 18 n.145.
114 Sierra Club III, 424 F. Supp. at 175.
115 See id. at 175–76.
116 Colburn, supra note 4, at 456 n.158 (citing Sax, supra note 16); see also Coggins, supra
note 56, at 18 (“Whether [the NPS] will ever be expanded into something more significant is in
part a function of agency willingness to assert it, a willingness heretofore largely lacking.”).
117 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Sax, supra note 16, at 243.
118 JOHN C. FREEMUTH, ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLITICS OF
EXTERNAL THREATS 137 (1991).
119 THE CONSERVATION FOUND., supra note 5, at 141.
120 Sax, supra note 16, at 258.
121 WILLIAM E. SHANDS, THE CONSERVATION FOUND., AN ISSUE REPORT: FEDERAL
RESOURCE LANDS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS 38 (1979).
122 THE CONSERVATION FOUND., supra note 5, at 250.
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“[o]ne can move the situs of the problem by acquisition, but the problem itself will
remain.”123 Moving the boundaries, short of buying every redwood tree in the
Northwest, only creates new neighbors with equally significant private interests that
will conflict with NPS goals. Therefore, while attractive, acquisition fails as a future
strategy for RNSP.

B. Nuisance Suits as a Solution
One option remains for the NPS: instigation of a nuisance suit against adjacent
landowners. Since external actions cause the enjoyment of RNSP to decline—by
directly affecting the well-being of RNSP trees—the government could prove a
prima facie case.124 Nuisance suits would be particularly apt for loss of scenic value,
since development and pollution cause “visitors [to be] less able to find a serene
setting in which to . . . enjoy nature.”125 Even lawful uses of land can become
nuisances; CDF approval would not save private logging. 126 Since the federal
government enjoys the right, on behalf of the NPS, to sue for nuisance like any
private landowner,127 the government may succeed in bringing a claim.
Before analyzing the possibility of a successful nuisance suit we must first
establish the types of nuisance suits the government could bring. First, the federal
government could bring a public nuisance claim against entities harming their parks
or monuments from outside their borders. A public nuisance “is an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public.”128 The Restatement broadly
defines unreasonable interferences, including conduct that could involve a
significant interference with “the public comfort or the public convenience.” 129 In
establishing national parks the government sought to preserve areas of national and
scenic importance and allow the public to enjoy those lands. 130 Preservation of
scenic areas is a right shared by all citizens because the government (and many vocal
citizens) have judged these areas vital to American culture and recreation. The

123 Sax, supra note 16, at 254.
124 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct., 920 P.2d 669, 696–97 (Cal. 1996); Mendez
v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 542–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); see
also Redevelopment Agency of Stockton v. BNSF Ry. Co., 643 F.3d 668, 672–73 (9th Cir. 2011);
Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., 98 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Biglane v.
Under the Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 14 (Miss. 2007).
125 John L. Giesser, Comment, The National Park Service and External Development:
Addressing Park Boundary-Area Threats Through Public Nuisance, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
761, 766 (1993).
126 Biglane, 949 So. 2d at 15.
127 Comment, Protecting National Parks from Developments Beyond Their Borders, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1984) [hereinafter Protecting National Parks]; see id. at 1194 n.33
(collecting cases where district courts allowed the federal government to sue to abate nuisances);
see also Sax, supra note 16 at 251–52 (stating the Supreme Court has recognized that when the
defendant’s conduct constitutes a nuisance “the prospect of the federal government having
something less than the rights of an ordinary proprietor to abate a nuisance” would be
“intolerable”).
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
129 Id. § 821B(2)(a).
130 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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ability to visit these areas shines as an example of a public right. If external threats
destroy the very objects of their enjoyment (their scenery), the public’s “comfort” in
visiting the areas declines, and the “convenience” of enjoying areas of aesthetic
beauty lessens.
The Restatement provides the following example of a public nuisance: “If,
however, the pollution [of a stream] . . . kills the fish in a navigable stream and so
deprives all members of the community of the right to fish, it becomes a public
nuisance.”131 Like the fish in this stream, runoff from logging or other human
development pollutes the water redwoods need to survive, depriving members of the
public of their right to see these redwoods. Dust or air pollution from nearby activity
could similarly distort the redwoods’ habitat. The harm to public rights is twofold:
(1) the environmental damage to rare species like redwoods and their habitat, and
(2) the aesthetic damage to beautiful (and protected) trees. By interfering with those
rights, external actors create a public nuisance.
Second, the federal government, as owners of RNSP, could bring a private
nuisance claim against loggers or other external actors. “A private nuisance is a
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land.”132 Courts have required that the invasion be unreasonable. 133 To determine
whether the conduct causes an unreasonable invasion of the landowner’s use and
enjoyment of land, courts balance the harm of the defendant’s action against the
utility of the challenged conduct. 134 Factors contributing to the harm of the
defendant’s action include: (1) extent of harm, (2) character of harm, (3) social value
of plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the land, (4) suitability of plaintiff’s use to the
locality, and (5) burden on plaintiff of avoiding the harm. 135 Conversely, factors
contributing to the utility of the challenged conduct include: (1) the social value of
the conduct, (2) suitability of the conduct to the locale, and (3) the impracticability
of avoiding the invasion.136
The government, as a landowner of national parks or monuments, has two
connected goals: protect areas of scenic, cultural, or recreational importance, and
gain revenue from park activities. The scenic value of landmarks—from redwood
trees to geysers to mountaintops—lies at the heart of the importance, and
profitability, of these locations; landmarks draw people to the parks. Harming
redwood trees both prevents the government from protecting the environment on its
land and reduces the likelihood citizens will want to spend money to see them. The
historical manner of logging—by causing runoff to seep into streams redwoods use
to survive—represents a form of water pollution long recognized as a quintessential

131

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g; see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON
645, 651 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON].
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D; see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct.,
920 P.2d 669, 696–97 (Cal. 1996); Biglane v. Under the Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 14 (Miss. 2007).
133 See, e.g., Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 542–
43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Wis. 1982).
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a).
135 Id. § 827; Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 192, 192 n.16.
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828.
THE LAW OF TORTS
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private nuisance.137 “Environmental nuisances often present the easiest [nuisance]
cases” because their “injuries . . . are more tangible and more readily measured,”138
including damage to property. Erosion and runoff from logging has already caused
significant damage to redwood trees in RNSP, while clearing trees near its
boundaries creates unpleasant open spaces contrasted with dense redwood forests. 139
The harm to redwoods therefore remains a potent threat to the stunning giants,
satisfying factors (1) and (2).
Like many national parks, RNSP generates millions of dollars in revenue. In
2010 alone, an estimated 700,000 visitors spent $42 million in RNSP, generating
hundreds of jobs.140 Aside from the satisfaction the federal government—and, by
extension, its constituents—receive from protecting areas of scenic beauty, the
tangible monetary benefits of RNSP remain high. As Northern California remains
an iconic area for redwoods, factors (3) and (4) are likely to be met.
Finally, the NPS can hardly avoid the harm caused by external factors. As
noted above,141 the NPS possesses precious few tools to combat threats outside its
borders. Therefore, they can do little to avoid the harm (factor (5)).
To be sure, the logging industry (and the other uses of residential and
commercial lands near RNSP and national parks everywhere) has value of its own.
Timber remains important to many fields, such as construction. The Humboldt
County timber industry creates revenues north of $440 million while creating over
7000 jobs.142 Those numbers, however, include logging for all trees, not only
redwoods; the contribution of redwoods is likely only a small percentage of those
figures. These numbers also include logging everywhere in Humboldt County, even
those areas far from RNSP. On the other hand, with fewer trees and less scenic
hikes, viewer use and enjoyment of RNSP would certainly decline, 143 substantially
interfering with visitors’ experience. Thus, both private and public nuisance suits
would likely succeed and justify injunctive relief. 144
Despite this promise, the author’s attempt to comb Westlaw for a single
nuisance case brought by the federal government concerning redwoods generated no
results. In general, “nuisance cases involving the federal government as plaintiff
have been relatively scarce.”145 The federal government sued an aluminum plant
whose emissions damaged trees and wildlife in Flathead National Forest and Glacier

137 See KEETON, supra note 131, at 619 (“A private nuisance may consist of . . . flooding,
raising the water table, or the pollution of a stream . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
138 John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 276 (2001).
139 See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
140 Visitors, Money, and Jobs for Local Economy, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Mar. 8, 2012),
https://www.nps.gov/redw/learn/news/local_economy.htm.
141 See supra Section III(A).
142 Lumber
and
Logging
on
the
North
Coast,
SUNNY
FORTUNA,
http://sunnyfortuna.com/festivals/logging/industry.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
143 See Giesser, supra note 125, at 798–99 (“[A] court likely would find that some
developments substantially interfere with park visitors by creating visual obstructions, noises,
odors, and commotion . . . .”).
144 See id. at 799–800.
145 Protecting National Parks, supra note 127, at 1192.
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National Park for trespass in 1979,146 but aside from that case, few examples exist
of this tactic, making its likelihood of success difficult to judge. Therefore, the tools
for a federal nuisance suit exist, and its lack of use is due less to its apparent
ineffectiveness than the NPS’s “failure to assert it.” 147
Three potential barriers to nuisance suits could challenge their effectiveness.
First, “[t]raditionally, aesthetic complaints were insufficient to establish a
nuisance.”148 For example, in Wernke v. Halas,149 the court found that a neighbor’s
combination of ugly orange fencing and a toilet seat nailed to a tree (coupled with
obscene language written in cement) did not constitute a nuisance because “it is wellsettled . . . that, standing alone, unsightliness, or lack of aesthetic virtue, does not
constitute a private nuisance.”150 Yet, the case of national parks protecting against
external threats is easily distinguished from these types of cases because (1) damage
to redwoods, by constituting environmental harm, causes more than aesthetic harm,
and (2) in most cases denying aesthetic nuisances, like Wernke, the aesthetic damage
occurred on someone else’s property. For RNSP here, the damage would be to
tangible property on their own lands, forcing them to use and enjoy the land
differently. Moreover, other courts believe that aesthetic harm, especially if
combined with other harm, can constitute a nuisance.151
Second, when deciding whether to enjoin a defendant’s harmful conduct,
courts consider the value of the defendant’s conduct. 152 If the defendant’s external
activity produces a great economic benefit, it could avoid injunctive relief.153
Though the timber industry—and other external activities—do create some benefits,
injunctive relief is still likely. Injunctive relief for environmental damage in the
nuisance context is “especially likely” due to “the enormous weight that is given to
the preservation of our national resources and the protection of the environment from
physical impairment.”154 In particular, for environmental damage creating

146 United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979). Though the
United States sued for a trespass, the jumping of emissions across property lines is more properly
characterized as a nuisance. See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 222 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999).
147 Protecting National Parks, supra note 127, at 1197.
148 Nagle, supra note 138, at 286.
149 600 N.E.2d 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
150 Id. at 121–22; see, e.g., Laubenstein v. Bode Tower, L.L.C., 392 P.3d 706, 710 (Okla.
2016) (“Nuisance claims founded solely on aesthetic harm are not actionable.”).
151 See, e.g., Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. App. 1984) (“[U]nsightly activity . . .
may become a private nuisance if it is unreasonably operated so as to be unduly offensive to its
neighbors . . . .”); Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 430 (Nev. 2013) (“[A]
nuisance in fact may be found when the aesthetics are combined with other factors, such as noise,
shadow flicker, and diminution in property value.”); Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186, 190–91 (Va.
1982) (holding that aesthetic harms related to junk and abandoned cars may interfere with the use
and enjoyment of land). Though few California state decisions discuss this issue, one California
court has held that “[i]n deriving a determination of the extent of the detriment suffered [from a
nuisance] the court may consider the sentimental and aesthetic values of things destroyed.” Griffin
v. Northridge, 153 P.2d 800, 802 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (emphasis added).
152 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
153 See KEETON, supra note 131, at 630–32.
154 Id. at 627.
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“irreparable harm,”155 there exists an even greater impetus for injunctive relief.
Because damage to redwoods clearly constitutes environmental damage, and
because the redwood tree’s imperiled position after years of logging makes
irreparable harm from further loss more likely, a court will likely grant injunctive
relief despite the clear economic benefit of timber.
Finally, the nuisance approach offers only a piecemeal solution to the more
structural problem of external threats. The NPS would have to fight externalities on
a case-by-case basis, which creates additional risk that conflicting or inappropriate
results occur, while disabling it from affecting more fundamental change to the
federal/nonfederal landowner relationship.156 By creating gaps between the desired
result (no external threats) and reality, a case-by-case approach allows potentially
harmful development to persist.157 On the other hand, it remains clear that nuisance
suits, however imperfect, move the NPS one step closer to a more optimal response
to external threats. Moreover, sustained nuisance litigation success would likely
deter external actors from continuing behavior that damages inner park resources,
even though the NPS may not realistically sue all possible threats. Therefore, the
case-by-case approach should not dissuade the NPS from litigation.

CONCLUSION
The above discussion paints a pessimistic view of how the NPS can respond to
external threats to RNSP. Though the NPS shares some blame—over-relying on
cooperation with state and local entities while ignoring potential litigation
solutions—the issue began with the initial Redwood National Park Act, which
created a systemic mismatch between boundaries and threats to redwoods. Given
the historic failure of California state regulatory bodies, and the lack of authority,
means, and willingness of the NPS to unilaterally regulate, redwoods largely still lie
at the mercy of external actors. Therefore, nuisance suits currently provide one of
the only solutions to protect RNSP.
Professor Sax may have been pessimistic when he argued that full protection
of national parks from external threats is “plainly impracticable,”158 but he was not
incorrect. That does not mean, however, the NPS cannot improve its current
position. By focusing on nuisance litigation until it can convince Congress to
expand its authority,159 the NPS can deter future harmful development while
safeguarding current redwoods to the maximum extent possible. Should the NPS
take such a route, its historic redwood trees would not remain helpless giants.

155 Id.
156 See Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A Study
of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 251–52 (1987); see also Sax, supra note
16, at 260 (characterizing litigation as “only an interim remedy”).
157 See id. at 252.
158 Sax, supra note 4, at 712.
159 A daunting task of its own, given congressional misgivings about expanding federal
regulatory power over property, a traditionally local concern. See supra notes 120–121 and
accompanying text.

